Germany’s first public wargame simulating a Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank has triggered debate about political hesitation within the alliance. The exercise, conducted by Die Welt in cooperation with the Bundeswehr’s Wargaming Center, modeled a crisis scenario around the Suwalki Gap, as reported by Euromaidan Press.
While the simulation suggested that Berlin became politically constrained as Moscow created “facts on the ground,” retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of United States Army Europe, cautioned against reading wargame outcomes as forecasts.
“Wargames are not meant to be predictive. They’re a device for examining courses of action, logistics, and time-space factors.”
At the same time, Hodges acknowledged the broader implications of delayed decision-making.
“It is useful, of course, to see that if Germany hesitates, that puts enormous pressure on everybody else. Same if the US hesitates.”
However, Hodges argued that the most significant weakness exposed by the discussion is not military capability, but how Europe responds to Russia’s gray-zone operations — tactics largely absent from the wargame itself.
“The Russians are already at war with us now. But they do it in such a way that makes it difficult for politicians to respond.”
According to Hodges, sabotage, infrastructure disruption, cyberattacks, and persistent probing are designed to remain below the threshold of open conflict while steadily testing Western reactions.
A central problem, he stressed, is the reluctance to impose consequences due to attribution challenges.
“We have got to get serious about inflicting consequences on the Russians for gray zone operations. Stop treating these like a crime scene where you have to have absolute 100% proof that it was Russia that did it.”
Hodges pointed to societal resilience as a critical factor, highlighting Ukraine and Finland as examples of preparedness-driven deterrence.
“You know why the Finns are never scared? Because they’re always prepared.”
He also warned that reinforcement timelines remain a structural vulnerability for the Baltic region.
“It might be two weeks before reinforcements arrive from outside of the Baltic States.”
Despite frequent concerns about Europe’s defensive capacity, Hodges dismissed the notion that the continent lacks the resources to counter Russia.
“Europe working with Canada, Norway, the UK, Ukraine, and Türkiye is more than enough to counter Russia.”
His conclusion was direct:
“I don’t know why Europeans are so worried about provoking Russia. Russia should be terrified of provoking Europe.”
The debate surrounding Germany’s wargame may have focused on hypothetical scenarios, but Hodges’ assessment underscores a broader reality: Russia’s pressure on Europe is already ongoing — primarily through gray-zone operations rather than conventional warfare.
